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On March 8, 1948 the Supreme Court of the United States de-
cided the case of McCollum v. Board of Education' holding that a
voluntary, part time program of religious education in the public
schools of Champaign, Illinois, was violative of the First Amend-
ment, "made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' 2 This decision followed only a year after that in the case of
Everson v. Board of Education3 in which a New Jersey law author-
izing the use of tax funds to reimburse parents of public and
parochial school children for their expenditures for transporting
their offspring to school via public common carriers was upheld
against the assertion that it was violative of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. Both opinions were written by Mr. Justice
Black. In the Everson case there were four dissents: Justices Jack-
son, Rutledge, Frankfurter and Burton. In the McCollum case the
only dissenter was Mr. Justice Reed. In both cases the dissent
seems to the writer to present the better argument. In both cases
the majority is out of step with the prevailing sentiment and mores
of the time.
Before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment it was gen-
erally conceded that the First Amendment applied only to acts by
the national government. " It expressly states that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of
the press . . ." Such questions as are presented by the McCollum
and Everson cases would clearly have been matters within the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the state courts before 1868. The Supreme
Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller in
the Slaughterhouse Cases, expressly renounced the concept that the
Bill of Rights of the federal Constitution was an enumeration of the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States and re-
fused to commit the Court to the role of ex post facto censor of
state legislation.5 There were four dissents.
The first encroachments on the doctrine of federal non-inter-
vention under the Fourteenth Amendment in matters covered by
the First Amendment arose in cases involving freedom of speech
and of the press. In Gitlow v. New York, Mr. Justice Sanford as-
sumed that freedom of speech and of the press were among the
168 Sup. Ct. 461 (1948).
2Id. at 464.
3330 U. S. 1 (1947).
4 Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 242 (U. S. 1833).
516 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1872); cf. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908), Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting.
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fundamental personal rights and "liberties" protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by
the states.' He made no allusion to the First Amendment in his
opinion. Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented. Only six years
later Mr. Chief Justice Hughes added fuel to the flame by invalidat-
ing the Minnesota newspaper injunction act as a violation of "the
liberty of the press guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."7
Justices Butler, Van Devanter, McReynolds and Sutherland dis-
sented.
There was no mention of the First Amendment in the decisions
of the Supreme Court dealing with state legislative and administra-
tive action until the advent of the Jehovah's Witnesses cases. In the
first of these, the Gobitis case, the court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, upheld a regulation of a public school board
requiring pupils to salute the flag, regardless of their religious be-
liefs." Mr. Justice Stone, in dissent said, "The law which is thus
sustained is unique in the history of Anglo-American legislation. It
does more than suppress freedom of speech and more than prohibit
the free exercise of religion, which concededly are forbidden by the
First Amendment and are violations of the liberty guaranteed by
the Fourteenth." 9 Here is a suggestion of the linking of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments as limitations upon state power which
came soon after.
In fact, the Gobitis case remained the law for only three years
when the same question as to the flag salute was presented to the
court again. This time an opposite conclusion was reached and the
state legislation was held invalid. 0 Mr. Justice Jackson, who de-
livered the opinion of the court, made the new doctrine as to the
status of the First Amendment quite clear. He said, "The test of
legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because
it also collides with the principles of the First, is much more definite
than the test when only the Fourteenth is involved. Much of the
vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the specific
prohibitions of the First become its standard ... It is important to
note that while it is the Fourteenth Amendment which bears di-
rectly upon the State it is the more specific limiting principles of the
First Amendment that finally govern this case."" ' There were dis-
sents by Justices Frankfurter, Roberts and Reed.
6 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
'Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 723 (1931).
sMinersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
9 Id. at 601.




OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The Barnette case was decided at the same term of court as
Murdock v. Pennsylvanial- in which the court invalidated an ordi-
nance of the City of Jeannette imposing a license tax upon solicitors.
as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses. The opinion of the court was
delivered by Mr. Justice Douglas, who said, "The First Amendment,
which the Fourteenth makes applicable to the states" 13 guarantees
certain freedoms which cannot be abridged through the taxing
power any more than through the police power. "A state may not
impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal
Constitution.' 14
Up to 1947, in the handling of cases involving freedom of re-
ligious groups, the Supreme Court was following a liberal and
popular pattern. Of course there were exceptions, such as the
Gobitis case, and there were cases in which the states and their
municipalities were permitted to exercise reasonable regulation of
religious groups and their activities under the police power, such as
Cox v. New Hampshire.13 But in the Everson case a somewhat
different issue arose. The problem had been faced once before in
Cochran v. Louisiana1 in which case the court approved the use of
tax funds for the purchase of textbooks for use in parochial schools.
Even earlier the court had held that parents might, in discharge of
their duty under state compulsory education laws, send their chil-
dren to a religious rather than a public school if the school met the
secular educational requirements imposed by the state.17 In this
case the Oregon statute requiring all children of school age to attend
public school was held unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In the words of Mr. Justice Rutledge's dissenting opinion in the
Everson case "For just as Cochran v. Board of Education, ... has
opened the way by oblique ruling for this decision, so will the two
make wider the breach for a third.18 Thus with time, the most
12319 U.S. 105 (1943).
"L Id. at 108.
'4 Id. at 113. For other recent cases involving limitations on freedom
of religion by state laws see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Largent v. Texas,
318 U.S. 418 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
(1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147 (1939).
1" 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
16281 U.S. 370 (1930).
3' Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
is This reference to obliqueness results from the fact that the First
Amendment issue was not raised by the briefs in the Cochran case.
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solid freedom gives way before continuing corrosive decisions ...
Compulsory attendance upon religious exercises went out early in
the process of separating church and state, together with forced ob-
servance of religious forms and ceremonies. Test oaths and reli-
gious qualification for office followed later . . .Hence today, apart
from efforts to inject religious training or exercises and sectarian
issues into the public schools, the only serious surviving threat to
maintaining that complete and permanent separation of religion and
civil power which the First Amendment commands is through use
of the taxing power to support religion, religious establishments, or
establishments having a religious foundation whatever their form
or special religious function."20 Mr. Justice Rutledge found in the
New Jersey practice a direct and palpable violation of the principle
of separation of church and state enjoined by the First Amendment.
Transportation was inseparable from other educational costs. The
purpose of the state's contribution was to defray the cost of convey-
ing the pupil to the place where he was to receive not only secular,
but also, and primarily, religious instruction. He did not deny the
value or necessity of religious training. But he did deny that it
could be aided or promoted in any way from the public -treasury.
Justices Franfurter, Jackson, and Burton joined in this dissent.
Mr. Justice Black in presenting the opinion of the court has a
lame argument indeed when compared with those advanced by
Justices Jackson and Rutledge in the dissent: He points out: (1)
the power of the Court to strike down state statutes, on the ground
that the purpose for which tax raised funds were to be expended
was not a public one, must be exercised with extreme caution; (2)
it is too late to argue (in view of the Cochran case) that legislation
to reimburse needy parents, or all parents for payment of the fares
of their children so that they can ride in public busses to and from
schools rather than run the risk of traffic and other hazards incident
to walking or "hitch hiking" serves no public purpose; (3) while the
state may not contribute tax funds to the support of any institution
which teaches the tenets and faith of any church, it may not deny
the benefits of its public welfare legislation to any person because
of. his faith or lack of it. The tax involved was likened to the
service rendered by police or fire departments which must be avail-
able to all alike. As far as Mr. Justice Black's argument is germane
to the matter dealt with in the opinion, it clearly points toward a
conclusion opposite from that which he reached on behalf of the
majority of the court. He concluded his presentation with the
following paragraph: "The First Amendment has erected a wall
19 330 U.S. at 29. o
20 Id. at 44.
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between church and state. That wall must be kept high and im-
pregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach. New Jersey
has not breached it here."'1  Such a conclusion is a patent non se-
quitur. It is not surprising that four justices dissented.
The Everson case laid the foundation for the McCollum case,
which was decided a year later. It also stimulated a widespread
public reaction, expressed by religious and secular publications and
by leaders of public opinion in all parts of the country. There were
even political repercussions, especially in the South. Mr. Justice
Black, as the spokesman for the majority, came in for some rather
severe personal criticism. By his opinion, even though it followed
the Cochran case, he had made a serious breach in the strict
separation of church and state so dear to the hearts of the voters in
the "Bible Belt," and ipso facto, to the politicians who depended
upon those voters. One possible explanation of the decision in the
McCollum case is that it seemed expedient to Mr. Justice Black and
to other members of the court to make amends for the Everson case
by "cracking down" on voluntary religious education in the public
schools. It is hard to find adequate justification for the conclusion
reached in any other way. Neither in the opinion of the court nor
in the concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr.
Justice Jackson is there any satisfactory explanation for the result
reached.
Mr. Justice Black, hin the opinion of the court in the McCollum
case, based the invalidation of the Champaign School District pro-
gram upon "the use of tax supported property for religious instruc-
tion and the close cooperation between the school authorities and
the religious council (including Catholic, Protestant, and Jew) in
promoting religious education."22 This arrangement, he thought,
fell "squarely under the ban of the First Amendment (made appli-
cable to the states by the Fourteenth) "2 as interpreted by the court
in the Everson case. The references which he made to that case are
to the dicta, such as the final paragraph, composed wholly of plati-
tudes not determinative of the issues involved. If the McCollum
case really had been decided on the basis of the Everson case it
would necessarily have gone the other way. Certainly consistent
persons cannot uphold taxes for religious purposes one day and
condemn them the next. Furthermore, of the two, the Everson
case, logically should have been found to have violated the First
and Fourteenth Amendments because the tax raised funds were
used in that case to benefit only one religious groun. while in thb
[Vol.9
COMMENTS
McCollum case the tax raised funds were used for benefit of all re-
ligious groups (Catholic, Protestant, and Jew).
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion was also
troubled about the intimate connection in the Champaign system
between religious and secular instruction. He presented in his
opinion a scholarly and illuminating survey of the history of religion
in education in this country. He admitted that the concept of
separation of church and state in American education is of compara-
tively recent development. Enough of the earlier idea of combined
effort in this field remained in 1875 to make the need for separation
worthy of comment by President Grant. Not until 1876 did
Congress begin to make non-sectarian public schools a condition of
the admission of new states to the union.
The increased tempo of modern life has made the home and
church less effective instrumentalities for religious education than
they once were. Parents who desire for their children the religious
education which they themselves had, turn to the church. The
church in turn points out that the time of the children is monopo-
lized by the school and asks for them to be "released" from a part
of this obligation for religious education. The parents approve.
Plans similar to that established in Champaign have been set up in
many localities in all parts of the country. By the McCollum case
all of these projects must be abandoned or revised to avoid the bases
for their condemnation.
One way in which the ban may be avoided is by using churches
rather than school buildings in which to hold the classes. This will
be less efficient, but the change is not an impossible one. In some
cities this already is being done. In the second place, the secular
school authorities must deny any official knowledge of or participa-
tion in the plan. This should be easier if the classes in religious
education are not held on the school premises. Finally, the classes
must be held entirely outside of the regular school hours. Of course
there is nothing to prevent the chaiiging of these hours, if state law
permits, in order to allow time for religious instruction. It goes
without saying that attendance on such classes should never be
compulsory and no public funds should be expended either for
salaries of teachers, or for supplies and equipment, or for rental of
space. The superintendent of schools may not have any hand
(officially) in the selection or retention of the teachers.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion suggested that
there may be ways in which the rigor of the case may be mitigated
by changes in local schemes. Mr. Justice Jackson, in a separate
concurring opinion, expressed considerable doubt as to whether the
facts of the case established jurisdiction in the court. He distin-
guished it from both the Barnette case and the Everson case (in
1948]
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which he dissented). He said, "In this case... any cost of this plan
to the taxpayers is incalculable and negligible . . . I think it is
doubtful whether the taxpayer in this case has shown any sub-
stanial property injury. 2 4 He clearly recognized the difficulty, if
not impossibilty, of removing all traces of religion from the secular
courses of the curriculum. He deplored the broad and sweeping
form of the decree requested by the petitioner and apparently ap-
proved by the court. He concluded his opinion by saying, "It is
idle to pretend that this task is one for which we can find in the
Constitution one word to help us as judges to decide where the
secular ends and sectarian begins in education. Nor can we find
guidance in any other legal source. It is a matter on which we
can find no law but our own prepossessions.
25
Mr. Justice Reed was alone in his dissent, although, from the
concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice
Jackson, it is clear that they were not completely convinced of the
desirability of the court's decision. In the dissent, the fact that
even at the University of Virginia, in 1824, religious sects were in-
vited to establish schools for instruction in their religion was cited
as evidence of the practice of that day. The difference between the
statements of Jefferson on the separation of church and state, and
the actual practice of the university he founded was considerable.
As Mr. Justice Reed pointed out, "A rule of law should not be drawn
from a figure of speech"26 such as Jefferson had uttered. The dis-
sent further suggested that churches all receive aid from the gov-
ernment in the form of freddom from taxation. The practices of
the federal government are pointed to as a similar type of "aid" to
religion as that proscribed by the court: an official chaplain for
Congress, chaplains for the armed forces, training for the ministry
under the G I Bill of Rights, compulsory chapel services at the
Military and Naval Academies. He said, "I cannot agree with the
Court's conclusion that when pupils compelled by law to go to
school for secular education are released from school so as to
attend religious classes, churches are unconstitutionally aided ...
the mere use of the school buildings by a non-sectarian group for
religious education ought not to be condemned as an establishment
of religion ... The prohibition of enactments respecting the estab-
lishment of religion do not bar every friendly gesture between
church and state. -2 7
The dissenting opinion concludes with an argument for affirm-
ance which makes a strong appeal to those who believe in state
24 68 Sup. Ct. at 476.
25 Id. at 478.
26 Id. at 482.
27 Id. at 486-487.
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sovereignty and control over education. "A state is entitled to have
great leeway in its legislation when dealing with the important
social problems of its population... Devotion to the great principle
of religious liberty should not lead us into a rigid.interpretation of
the constitutional guarantee that conflicts with accepted habits of
our people."28 The court is reaping the whirlwind from the wind
sown by Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota. Perhaps it
would have been better if the court never had extended the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to include the guaran-
tees of the First Amendment, which were clearly intended to be
limitations only upon Congress. A reversion to the rule of Barron
v. Baltimore, The Slaughterhouse Cases, and Twining v. New Jersey
would relieve the court from the onerous duty of serving as a board
of censors for the states and probably would prevent it from making
such bad and inconsistent law on the subject of church and state as
is found in the Everson and McCollum cases. If the court is entering
upon this new line of decision because it is not satisfied with the
way the state courts are dealing with the bills of rights of the state
constitutions, a better solution would seem to be awakening citizens
to demand better administration of their own state laws rather than
reducing the administration of public law to a dead level of federal
control.
Harvey Walker, Sr.
28 Id. at 487.
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